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Doing National Identity through Transnationality: Categorizations of 
Inequality in German Integration Debates 
Thomas Faist and Christian Ulbricht1  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Immigration and the social integration of migrants have raised the issue of group boundaries 
around (national) identity. Historically, states have used immigration policy as a tool in 
fostering a particular national identity (Zolberg 2006), and integration policies and debates 
have served to answer the question “who are we?” In contemporary public debates in 
Germany, as in other immigration countries in Europe and North America, the issue of 
national identity looms large, especially in drawing attention to the social integration of 
immigrants whose dispositions, principles, worldviews and competences are, allegedly, at 
times incompatible with liberal-democratic values and norms2.  Debates abound over such 
issues as the compatibility of Islam with democracy and with gender equality; the relationship 
between migrants’ cross-border ties and national loyalty in dual citizenship; and transnational 
political claims-making of migrants. These debates have been inextricably related to and 
discussed in terms of “non-integration”, “failed integration” or “disintegration”. This negative 
coding often refers to transnationality, to cross-border transactions in the broadest sense. 
Typically, for more than two decades, the ‘3 Ts’ have been identified by many a politician and 
writer as contributing to disintegration and segregation: e.g., Turkish television received via 
satellite and cable, low telephone costs for international calls, and cheap cross-border travel 
via air flights (Scholl-Latour 1999: 268). Implicitly, the claim seems to be that while the 
national is associated with integration, the transnational more often connotes disintegration. 
Transnational here refers to migrants’ cross-border ties, often to the countries of origin. In 
essence, the question is how national identity is discursively constituted by referring to what 
could be called transnational. And what are the implications of constituting the national for 
issues of resources, status, privilege and power? 
 
The integration of immigrants has turned into a question of incorporating or rejecting creeds 
and principles. The associated processes have been ambiguous, as we observe changing 
boundaries but also new boundaries and the hardening of old boundaries. Here, the term 
boundary refers to specific patterns of relations and representation between groups located 
on one or the other side. Thus boundaries denote social relations, representations, 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 4
perceptions,and evaluations (Barth 1969). One manifestation of shifting boundaries is that 
entire groups are now perceived to belong to the whole of (national) society, or at least to be 
on their way. In contemporary Europe this can be seen in efforts to incorporate organized 
Islam institutionally (Laurence 2006). For example, in Germany, there has been a gradual 
adaptation of existing corporatist institutions regulating church-state relations to better 
capture the realities of immigration situations. Interfaces such as the national “Islam 
Conference” have been established in which Muslim organizations have begun to function as 
public agents (Tezcan 2012). Human rights norms have also been used to rationalize steps 
toward organizational incorporation of Islam in Germany. An explicit transnational 
phenomenon involving shifting boundaries is dual citizenship. Even countries which reject 
dual citizenship as a rule, such as Germany, nowadays have a high percentage of new 
citizens, indeed almost half of them, who are not asked to renounce their former citizenship 
upon naturalization. This situation is influenced by human rights considerations in the case of 
persons who would otherwise be stateless but also considerations of gender equity (Faist 
2007). Yet, there is also a hardening of boundaries by means of exclusionary tendencies, as 
evidenced by what has been called civic integrationism in Europe, rejecting multicultural 
accommodation. Examples can be seen in bans on religious attire (see Amiraux, this 
volume) or in outright exclusion, either at the border–through more stringent admissions 
policies, for example, regarding family reunification–or from the fabric of civic life–through 
rigorous naturalization tests. Also, above and beyond dual citizenship, the issue of terrorism 
has kept the significance of cross-border ties alive in public debates. 
 
There is indeed a puzzle: both the inclusion of the transnational into the national but also its 
exclusion need to be accounted for. The transnational is part of what one could call the non-
national, yet does not exhaust this latter category. The non-national, for example, could refer 
to multiple national identities without necessarily implying cross-border ties. This analysis 
deals with part of the puzzle in the discursive realm by examining public debates on the 
juxtaposition of national identity and migrants’ transnational ties in Germany since the 1990s. 
Doing national identity means that it is not a quasi-natural phenomenon but needs to be 
socially reconstituted on a continual basis to tap into specific reciprocity and specific 
solidarity needed to underpin national policies and politics. It is in public debates that parts of 
these efforts at the social constitution of national identity become visible. Three questions 
stand at the centre. First, what is the role of doing national identity via the transnational ties 
of migrants for integration discourse, that is, what are the categorizations of the transnational 
vis-à-vis the national? Second, what are the mechanisms operative in the usage of 
transnationality to define the national? And third, in which ways is the binary 
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transnational/national instrumentalized politically through symbolic politics and integration as 
a meta-issue, that is, as a frame which is connected to manifold social, economic and 
political problems? The empirical examples provided are meant to illustrate how a social 
mechanism analysis3 of transnationality as a marker of difference – in the following referred 
to as heterogeneity (Blau 1977) – may work4.   
 
The role of transnationality for defining national identity and integration needs to be placed 
within a broader understanding of heterogeneities and inequalities. Transnationality, and this 
is a new claim we are advancing, is a marker. It is thus akin to differences of income, gender, 
religion, sexual orientation or age. Here, transnationality is seen as an attribute ascribed to 
some (not all) migrants and which is considered to be good for some and bad for others.   
Transnationality as a heterogeneity has two dimensions. First, transnationality is a binary 
categorization, as in the juxtaposition of national vs. transnational. In this case it is a largely 
ascriptive heterogeneity, ascribed to persons, groups or organizations. The juxtaposition is 
significant since the national is often tied to the integration of immigrants whereas references 
to the transnational signal challenges to social integration or even disintegration. Second, 
transnationality can be a nominal categorization, evaluated, for example, as either good or 
bad, depending on the category and context applied. In academic and public debates alike, 
transnationality is regarded as a desirable element of upward mobility for people with higher 
incomes and for the educated classes (Mau and Mewes 2007). However, persons of lower 
social status are often considered to have barely any transnational ties, or – as in the case of 
migrants – transnationality is associated with non-desirable downward mobility, coupled with 
the risk of social segregation and disintegration (Esser 2006). In this second meaning 
transnationality is associated with worldviews and lifestyles5.   
 
Heterogeneities such as transnationality are not in themselves natural or self-evident 
categories which then translate into inequalities. There is always a process underlying the 
production of inequalities in the context of such heterogeneities. For example, from a Marxist 
point of view differences in resource endowments in labor markets and capitalist production 
translate into class inequalities by means of surplus extraction through the mechanism of 
exploitation. Or take gender as heterogeneity. It is through mechanisms of social closure that 
gender assumes crucial importance in the ranking and sorting of workers, and – indirectly – 
for the division of labor in child care. In the production of inequalities out of gender as a 
heterogeneity, various categorizations are at work, for instance the attribution of allegedly 
innate abilities (for example, motherly love) to women. To conceive of transnationality as a 
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heterogeneity allows us to link the concept to studies of inequality which are focused on the 
processes, and more concretely, the mechanisms that lead from differences to inequalities.  
 
Tracing the production and maintenance of inequalities out of heterogeneities such as 
transnationality is at the core of this analysis. Changing views on migrants’ transnational ties 
in Germany can be clearly discerned in the shift from the early years of recruitment to the 
settlement of some migrants. In the early 1960s when “guestworkers” initially arrived in 
Germany, there was an expectation that they would return to their countries of origin, such as 
Turkey. While the majority actually did so, a significant number remained. In the early period, 
transnational ties, embodied in the sense that migrants would eventually return to their home 
country, were seen as positive and thus an inherent part of the migration process. This view 
changed completely in later years when public debates focused on issues of integration. It 
was then that evaluations in public and academic debates gradually came to prevail in which 
transnational ties, for example, in continued attachment to and political engagement in the 
country of origin, were seen as problematic signs of non-integration in Germany. More 
recently, there is evidence in data from the General Survey in the Social Sciences 
(Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, ALLBUS) which suggests that 
between 1996 and 2006 significant changes took place in boundaries between migrant 
groups (immigrants) and the majority group (German-Germans). First, over a period of ten 
years, the majority group has changed its perception of certain migrant groups – hailing 
originally from Italy, Spain and Greece – and now considers them as belonging to the 
majority. The national “we” now includes other citizens from European Union countries. 
However, there were also categories where no change took place, or where there was even 
an increase in perceived dissimilarity, such as the category “Muslim”. Second, the 
percentage of the population consenting to the claim that those born in the country should 
also be given the right to naturalize has increased (Faist 2010). 
 
The analysis undertaken in this paper is meant to serve as a sketch for the more systematic 
empirical content analysis of documents in public debates on national identity and integration 
in Germany and other OECD countries. Here, we delineate initial insights from an analysis of 
anthologies on public debates, based mainly on Göktürk et al. 2007, parliamentary debates 
in the German Bundestag and secondary literature. As such, this analysis has a 
programmatic intention. We concentrate on two realms of the German integration debates: 
the discourse on dual citizenship, and social and religious life which emphasizes cultural 
difference, with a particular focus on migration which originated in Turkey6.   
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Categorizations on the Basis of Transnationality 
 
The premise is that the national is defined by contrasting it to the transnational which implies 
at the same time thatthe national needs to be separate and distant from the transnational. 
This constitutes a social regularity which has been raised, among others, by George Herbert 
Mead, who argued that a person’s identity is formed by interaction with a “generalized other”. 
This latter term refers to the social group that delivers to the individual his or her unity of self. 
Mindful activity involves a conversation between the objects immediately available in the 
social environment, representing the generalized other (the “me”) and the person (the “I”). It 
is by means of reflexiveness – turning the experience of the individual back upon him- or 
herself – that agents are able to perceive the attitude of the other toward them. 
“Reflexiveness”, according to Mead (1967: 134, 138), “is the essential condition, with the 
social process, for the development of mind.” The self thus can be conceived of as a social 
structure that arises in and through communication and social experience. The attitude of the 
generalized other is the attitude of the whole community (Mead 1967: 154). This means that 
the environment influences the person or group through the way in which it is perceived. In a 
nutshell, in Mead’s theory of self, it is through the response of others that we become aware 
of our own attitudes and selves. Importantly, we cannot know ourselves without first being 
involved in symbolic communication with others. Communication thus precedes conscious 
rationality (see also Plessner 1981 (1928): 383, 392). Persons and groups – we may even 
think of organizations or systems – know about themselves through their environment. 
Persons and groups can only see what they allow themselves to see.  
 
Mead argues that it is through the response of the Other that the self and identity are 
constituted. We could go one step further: The self also announces what that Other (here, 
migrants attributed with transnationality) seems to be about. In our case, the self, the nation, 
also seems to know exactly what the Other is all about. To fulfil an identity-generating and 
maintaining function, there is not necessarily a need for an actual response from the Other. 
The powerful position of nationals may even allow them to engage in a conversation on the 
Other all on their own. 
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Binary Categorizations 
 
The debates on integration and the national “we” mutually reinforce each other: the 
imagination of the national “we” is supported by tenets on integration, and the reference to 
the transnational ties of migrants serves to distinguish integration from non-integration or 
disintegration. Some of the transnational can be incorporated into the national, especially if it 
conforms to liberal principles, in contrast to fundamentalist beliefs. Yet the transnational has 
to remain somewhat alien so that it can function and be used as a distinguishing marker by 
categorizing the Other. This implies two processes. First, national identity is not clearly 
defined beyond very general ideas such as competence in the national language(s) and 
loyalty to the constitution. Yet, second, in contrast to national identity, the transnational is 
quite often referred to in somewhat specific terms, such as cross-border, fundamentalist 
terrorism based on Islam. Only in this way can it serve political purposes. Nonetheless, the 
culturalization through reference to integration applies only to certain immigrant groups, and 
there are changes over time in that some groups are then perceived as part of “us”. For 
example, “guestworkers” from Italy were considered the Other in the 1960s, to be replaced 
gradually by migrants from Turkey and later Muslims.  German citizens abroad (especially 
the highly educated, such as scientists) and highly-skilled labor to be recruited are not 
discussed in terms of integration but in the frame of economic competitiveness. These 
results can be arrived at through a careful analysis of categorizations, namely binary 
categorizations such as national vs. transnational, and nominal categorizations, distinctions 
within transnationality which form the basis of normative judgments as to its desirability. 
 
The debates on national identity as part of discussions on social integration have evaded a 
definition of “what is a German?” This point can be seen very clearly in a debate which, at 
first sight, sought to clarify the demands placed upon immigrants in Germany, namely the 
debate on the German “guiding culture”. CDU-politician Friedrich Merz instigated the debate 
in 2000 in the newspaper Die Welt. Other than references to the importance of allegiance to 
the constitution and the law, no clear definition of this guiding culture can be found. Though 
rich in insinuations regarding cultural heritage, all other statements remain cryptic: “The 
country must be tolerant and open; immigrants who want to live with us on a long-term basis 
must, for their part, be ready respect the rules of coexistence in Germany”. This guiding 
culture has an explicit liberal outlook:  “I have described these rules as the liberal German 
guiding culture”. This means that  “(t)he constitutional tradition of our Basic Law is essential 
to our country’s culture of civil liberties” and that  “German culture was shaped decisively 
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after World War Two by the European idea (...) with a Europe of peace and freedom, based 
on democracy and a social market economy”. This idea of a guiding culture is set apart from 
positions associated with the violation of civil liberties and human rights:  “Integral to our 
system of freedom is the position of woman in our society, which was achieved only after 
decades of struggle”7 (Merz, cited in Göktürk et al. 2007 313) The debate on guiding culture 
can be seen as mainly of strategic use in party politics since the other culture (Islam) is 
neither simply traditional nor new. Journalist Gustav Seibt observed that in  
 
(t)he CDU  (...) has developed the concept ‘German guiding culture’ as a new 
answer to these circumstances. (Q) The content of the idea is diffuse, applying 
to everything from the Basic Law and command of the German language to 
‘Western values’ (...) However unclear the content of the concept ‘guiding culture’ 
may be, its function is clear. The phrase guiding culture denotes an empty space: 
the assimilative attraction that enables immigration societies to receive foreigners 
and still retain their own identity. (Seibt, cit. in Göktürk et al. 2007: 314; see also 
Mark Terkessidis, cit. Göktürk et al. 2007: 316)  
 
In some parts of these debates the national is more clearly defined only because it is 
juxtaposed to the transnational. Overall, the national, as exemplified by the debate on the 
guiding culture, is ambiguous, equivocal and pluri- or multivalent in terms of meaning. The 
transnational, by contrast, is usually portrayed in these discourses as a concrete danger or at 
the very least a problem associated with broader incompatibilities, such as accession of 
Turkey to the European Union. Social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler commented that 
“(e)verywhere in Europe, Muslim minorities cannot be assimilated and seclude themselves in 
their subculture. The Federal Republic has no problem of foreigners, but only a Turkish 
problem.” (Die Zeit, 12 September 2002). The incompatibility of cultures in this view 
pervades social integration on a more systemic level. Populist writer Thilo Sarrazin is one of 
the latest exponents:  
 
I curse satellite receivers, without those we would be much further along with 
integration. (Q) Learning German is up to 80% the task of the migrants. (Q) But 
if I read Turkish newspapers only, watch Turkish TV only and meet Turkish 
friends only, I do not want to integrate. (Die Welt, 10 March 2010).  
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In a fashion typical for much of the immigrant integration debate, Sarrazin changes back and 
forth between the non-national in a wide sense (Islam) and the migrants’ cross-border 
communication. The transnational ties of some categories of migrants are seen as simply 
leading to ethnic and religious segregation. 
 
There is a similarity in the way in which the transnational and, often at the same time, the 
multicultural are defined:  both are believed to lead to disastrous outcomes8.  A typical 
statement on multiculturalism as a threat to national integration from conservative politicians 
reads like this:  
 
Q we must hand down a clear rejection of multicultural ideologies. With the 
concept ‘multicultural’, a link is usually made to the notion that different foreign 
cultures have equal rights alongside German culture and that (Q) they will be 
recognized as a piece of our national culture. This approach amounts to the 
formation of an official ’state of many peoples’, which neglects the concerns of 
the German majority populations in an unacceptable way. The consequences 
would ultimately be to relinquish the nation as a community of laws and common 
destiny, a loss of identity and the feeling of belonging together, (Q) and the 
development of segregated ‘parallel societies’. (Günter Beckstein, former Minister 
of Interior of Bavaria, cit. in Göktürk et al. 2007: 303)  
 
It is toward those failures arising out of what is perceived to be actually existing 
multiculturalism that the demand for integration (Integrationsaufforderung) is directed. Ever 
since the 1990s multiculturalism in public debates, much like the references to cross-border 
transactions of former “guestworkers”, has served as a foil for dystopian visions. 
 
Regarding transnationality, in the aftermath of 9/11 and during the controversy over dual 
citizenship in the late 1990s, it has become central to the definition of national integration. 
First, 9/11 resulted in reinforced demands for integration. As political scientist Bassam Tibi 
noted in Die Zeit:  
 
The terror attacks of September 11 proved in a concrete way that security issues 
are closely connected to immigration, given that the attacks were organized in 
the German Islamic Diaspora (Q) Nowadays, only the integration of Muslim 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 11 
migrants offers an effective means to counter religious extremism. (Tibi, cit. in 
Göktürk et al. 2007: 228).  
 
While 9/11 may not have been the primary cause of the demand for intensified efforts at 
integration, it certainly directed more water to the mills of adaptation into the national “we” 
against the transnational Other. It is an interesting example of the way in which transnational 
phenomena, such as terrorism, add to the constitution of the national itself. A transnational 
phenomenon such as terrorism can be used to legitimate nationalist exclusion. Coupled with 
the suspicion harbored against Muslims as loyal citizens has been the fear that they are 
manipulated from abroad:  
 
Turkish voters with dual citizenship are not ‘neutral’ voters who hold the future of 
the new homeland dear to their hearts. As long as they allow themselves to be 
manipulated so completely by the press in Turkey, they will remain ‘foreigners’, 
who are just exploiting the right to vote. (Irina Wiesner9, cit. in Göktürk et al. 
2007: 161)  
 
Second, the dual citizenship issue aroused by far the greatest extent of emotional and 
normative debate over integration of both immigrants and the nation, especially in the late 
1990s. Ironically, while the Social Democratic-Green coalition, which came into office in 1998 
(and worked until 2005), called for abolishing the requirement of renouncing one’s former 
citizenship when acquiring German citizenship, the reform finally enacted in 2000 did not 
make many inroads in this respect. A degree of liberalization was introduced with added 
exemptions to the law regarding family ties and business activities (to already existing 
exemptions such as the avoidance of statelessness). The children of immigrants, however, 
still must choose at maturity which citizenship they wish to hold. At the same time a rather 
far-reaching (by European standards) jus soli found its way into the new citizenship law.  
 
Dual citizenship has been discussed since the early 1990s in Germany only with respect to 
integration. Explicit transnational considerations did not enter into the debates about dual 
citizenship even though a growing percentage of the populace is born abroad or has parents 
who immigrated. Instead, in public debates over the past 20 years politicians from all parties 
have viewed dual citizenship predominantly as a way to lower the hurdles for naturalization in 
removing emotional and social barriers. The overarching goal has been social integration into 
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the national state and overall migrant social integration. The difference in political positions 
has been whether or not dual citizenship should be tolerated for this goal or whether it should 
be rejected. For the latter position, the following statement by a member of the Bundestag 
succinctly summarizes the position of the CDU: “Of course, one could entertain links into 
various countries for various reasons. However, viewed from a citizenship perspective, there 
should be membership and belonging to one and one country only.”10   
 
Nominal Categorizations 
 
In addition to the binary perspective, transnationality can also be categorized nominally, for 
example, good vs. bad, desirable vs. non-desirable, for migrants and non-migrants alike. 
Nominal categorizations refer to particular subsets of immigrants or non-immigrants whose 
cross-border social practices and demands are deemed to be either incompatible with or 
desirable for liberal politics. Here, the connection between transnationality and social 
inequality seems to be characterized by a dualism. On the one hand, for people with higher 
incomes and for those who hold degrees from tertiary educational institutions, geographic 
mobility and transnational networks are often regarded in public and academic debates alike 
as a social asset, an element of upward social mobility (for a differentiated empirical analysis 
of this claim in the German context, see Ette and Sauer 2010). On the other hand, persons of 
lower social status are considered to have barely any transnational ties; or if they do, 
transnationality is associated with downward mobility, coupled with the risk of social 
segregation and disintegration. In this latter perspective, migrant groups with few material 
resources, and little cultural and social ‘bridging’ capital beyond immigrant enclaves, are 
thought to derive no benefit from cross-border ties. Instead, transnational practices are seen 
as an expression of ethnic segregation (cf. Esser 2008).   
 
There are two groups which exemplify nominal categorizations of transnationality at the 
upper end of this dualism: the so-called highly qualified from abroad who are to be attracted 
to work in Germany, and highly-qualified German citizens who work abroad as professionals 
and scientists. In both cases there is a striking absence of the integration discourse. Instead, 
the core of the public debates centers around the positive or negative repercussions for 
economic competitiveness of national economies, be they claims about “brain gain” or “brain 
drain”. It seems that the categorization along culture pertains to the ranking of low-status 
immigrants, while categorizations in terms of economic utility are reserved for highly-skilled 
immigrants and German citizens who are emigrants. The main empirical question then is: in 
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which context and toward which category is the distancing mechanism used to draw 
boundaries? 
 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder launched a “Green Card Initiative” in 2001 to attract highly-
qualified personnel to the labor markets in Germany, reasoning that  
 
(i)f we do not want to lose the competition for the best minds, we need an 
objective and informed debate on a labor market-oriented immigration (Q) Given 
the demographic trends, we should try early on to gain in the long run a sufficient 
number of skilled workers for our economy. There is a fierce international 
competition for these professionals. With the Green Card initiative, we have given 
a powerful impulse to the issue of immigration. (Q) With this contribution to rapid 
alleviation of skill shortages in the IT sector, we shall provide additional jobs for 
the people in this country. Because statistically, each Green Card Expert has 
created on average two and a half additional jobs. 11 
 
As with highly-skilled labor from abroad, the national state as a “competition state” (Cerny 
1997) is concerned not only about gaining brains but also the emigration of its own “highly 
qualified” citizen-workers. While the term “brain drain” in the 1970s denoted the exodus of 
highly skilled labor from so-called developing to economically developed countries, it has 
now entered the discussions of OECD countries with regard to its geographically mobile 
citizens. Discussion was sparked in 2006, when emigration from Germany reached the 
highest level since 1954, that is, more persons left Germany than entered12.  In comparison 
to other OECD countries, the number of German citizens moving abroad was in the middle 
range. Therefore, there is nothing exceptional about this situation. Nonetheless, in public 
discourses Germany turned from being a “reluctant country of immigration” directly into being 
a “country of emigration”, evidenced by mass media, such as TV soap operas entitled 
Umzug in ein neues Leben (Moving into a New Life) or Goodbye Deutschland: die 
Auswanderer (Goodbye Germany: the emigrants). The Economist on 26 October 2006 even 
opined that Germans abroad will be tomorrow’s (new) guestworkers. The accompanying 
public debates singled out particular professions, especially scientists. In these 
commentaries Germany’s Nobel prize winners had only one option to escape Germany’s 
restrictive and stifling regulation of scientific work – move to the United States. This scenario 
tied neatly with the concern about the “flight of the creative class” (Florida 2007) and 
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Germany’s losing its “best and brightest”. All of this discourse mirrored the terminology 
applied to the “global hunt for talent” (Kapur and McHale 2005)13.  
 
Considerations of inequality have entered into the debates in a particular case which stands 
at the intersection of labor migration and the mobility of the so-called highly-qualified. This is 
the case of the children of former “guestworkers” who move from Germany to take up work in 
economic powerhouses in Turkish cities such as İstanbul and İzmir. Somewhat 
provocatively, such movements have been called “second generation return” (see King and 
Christou 2010). The primary interpretation of this phenomenon refers to discrimination 
encountered by the “second generation” in Germany and to failed integration, finding fault not 
with the children of immigrants but the majority population (Sievers et al. 2010). 
  
In sum, transnationality thus doesn’t always and necessarily lead to new inequalities nor 
does it necessarily reinforce old ones. Here, a comparison with Georg Simmel’s concept of 
the “stranger” is instructive (Simmel 1992: 746): Transnationality can only be imagined via 
contact with nationality, and this connection is only made when relevant for cultural, political 
or economic reasons. Therefore, we should be aware that the evaluation of migrants’ 
transnational ties depends on context. Transnationality is an ambiguous category.  
 
Mechanisms Underlying Categorizations 
 
The drawing of boundaries between national integration and (potential) transnational 
disintegration constitutes a set of processes which call for a closer analysis of the underlying 
social mechanisms. Such mechanisms are cautious generalizations referring to recurrent 
processes and identifiable causalities. An analysis guided by mechanisms and focused on 
public debates shows how inequalities are generated and reproduced out of transnationality, 
constantly interacting with heterogeneities in, for example, religion, ethnicity, gender or legal 
status. We also need to take a closer look at the response of those who are categorized as 
transnational.  
 
Before outlining these mechanisms, it is important to point out that the hierarchizing 
mechanisms analyzed here are typical but not necessarily representative. An example 
relates to the institutional incorporation of Islam into the German corporatist political 
landscape. Here we observe ambiguous processes, namely both new boundaries and the 
hardening of old boundaries. On the one hand, the institutional incorporation of Islam is 
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evident. In general, corporatist institutions are those which mediate between state and 
private institutions and fulfill public functions, such as unions and employer associations 
which, in Germany, are autonomous in determining wages and working conditions without 
state interference. In a similar way, the Christian churches and the Jewish community have 
the status of a “corporation of public law”, which enables them, for example, to be members 
on the boards ofpublic mass media programming and control boards, give religious 
instruction in public schools and have church taxes collected by the state. As a first step 
toward a public role for Muslim organizations, the human right to religious practice has been 
used to rationalize measures toward organizational incorporation of Islam in Germany 
(Koenig 2007). On the other hand, there is also a hardening of boundaries with exclusionary 
tendencies: there are always those who do not fit, for example, Islamic fundamentalists. The 
latter processes are part of civic integrationism in Europe, rejecting multicultural 
accommodation. 
 
Turning to the social processes of classification with respect to immigrant integration, we 
note that this is a matter of social power, since categorizations can be seen as strategic 
instruments of inequalities. The three most prevalent discursive mechanisms regarding social 
integration of migrants producing inequality in public debates are symbolic exclusion, 
culturalist ranking and generalization (homogenization), all of which result in hierarchization. 
The mechanism of symbolic exclusion works primarily through the specific mechanism of 
cultural ascription. It pertains, for example, to the question of whether Islam is a part of 
German culture. Former Federal President Christian Wulff initiated a debate in 2010 when he 
claimed: “But Islam nowadays also belongs to Germany” (Aber der Islam gehört inzwischen 
auch zu Deutschland). Critics immediately conceded the point but emphasized that “we” are 
steeped in the Christian-Jewish tradition. The Prime Minister of Hessia, Volker Bouffier, 
claimed that Christendom and Islam are fundamentally incompatible as long as there is no 
liberalized, European Islam. Another example is the debate on dual citizenship. The 
overwhelming majority of voices in public debates since the 1990s have not considered 
transnational ties of actual and future citizens as an integral part of citizenship, which should 
in their view be nationalized. In other words, cross-border transactions in themselves are not 
taken to be relevant for citizenship. It is only an individual’s country of origin that needs 
somehow to be tolerated in order to lower the threshold for citizenship acquisition, rendering 
transnational ties primarily as an emotional component of the citizenship calculus of 
immigrants. 
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Public debates also rely on a second mechanism, the discursive ranking of cultures by way 
of distinguishing various categories of transnational migrants and mobiles. As pointed out 
above, there is a clear distinction around the desirability of transnationality for distinct groups: 
for labor migrants from abroad in Germany transnationality is considered a first step toward 
exclusion and segregation. This may result in the symbolic devaluation of the resources of 
certain categories. In essence, this devaluation is legitimized through reference to socio-
cultural backwardness and the danger of segregation and disintegration. In this perspective 
transnationality simply is another word for an undesirable “parallel society”. For the highly-
skilled, moving into or out of Germany, aliens or citizens, transnationality is discussed without 
any culturalist ranking but as a prerequisite for increasing economic competitiveness of the 
national economy and as a jump start for persons who experience upwardly mobile 
patterns14.  Therefore, we may hypothesize that symbolic exclusion is a typical example of 
binary categorizations of transnationality. Subsequently, discursive ranking is an example of 
a mechanism signifying nominal categorizations of transnationality. 
 
The mechanisms of symbolic exclusion and cultural ranking intersect with a third social 
mechanism, namely generalization. The mechanism of generalization is important because it 
connects the realms of discourses and public policies, as exemplified in the debate over 
proposed guidelines for naturalization in Baden-Württemberg15.  The category of persons 
called Muslims is frequently portrayed and perceived as a relatively coherent community. In 
some public debates this generalization is connected with devaluation and exclusion. What is 
interesting is that governmental efforts usually have not been intended to devalue Muslim 
applicants for German citizenship. Instead, the measures have served to differentiate 
between the wheat and the chaff, distinguishing between secular Muslims and problematic 
cases. The reasoning given is that extremists should not be naturalized. In this way national 
integration policy and the fight against terrorism and political-religious extremism are 
semantically connected. The key term is prevention: as the “war against terrorism” does not 
rest content with identifying those who actually committed terrorist acts, integration policy 
may seek to prevent those ready to exert violence from becoming citizens. In order to make 
such distinctions, civics knowledge and mastery of the national language are desirable but 
are not the main point. Instead, positions with respect to values and norms are decisive. In 
the proposed naturalization test in Baden-Württemberg, for example, questions ask  parents 
how they would react if their daughter wanted to dress like other (German) girls and women, 
or when a son or brother was insulted; if a man married several women; and if they would 
use force to marry off their daughter. The panoply of questions covered practically all publicly 
debated issues such as gender relations, the headscarf, homosexuality, honour killings, 
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forced marriage, terrorism and freedom of religion. The answers were meant to give a 
comprehensive picture of the inner disposition of the applicant. Eventually, the federal 
government decided on a standard test which abstained from examining the internal 
disposition and ethos of applicants; a sign that civil integrationism may indeed not be so 
aggressive but conform to liberal standards. Nonetheless, the debate around the test showed 
that generalization of characteristics expressed by German-German journalists, in this case 
stereotypes about Islam, proved to be the main mechanism. 
 
There are various strategies used by political agents claiming to speak for those symbolically 
excluded and for those whose symbolic resources are devalued. There are at least two 
mechanisms of framing, that is, symbolic inclusion and reactive reframing. A particularly 
potent example of efforts at symbolic inclusion, in this case into another national community, 
can be found in a speech delivered by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan in the Köln 
Arena in 2008 (see also Langenohl and Rauer 2012). Significantly, Erdoğan did not mention 
the term integration but pronounced “assimilation as a crime against humanity”.16  His 
remarks ultimately did not refer to Germany but to Turkish domestic politics (the 
overwhelming part of his speech dealt with Turkey). He started with the claim that there is 
forced assimilation in Germany, and followed with what appear at first glance to be two 
seemingly contradictory messages. First, he encouraged those he considers his compatriots 
to participate actively in German life and not to consider themselves as victims of 
discrimination. Second, he went on in extensive detail – and for most of his speech – praising 
the social and economic policy achievements of his government. Both claims were linked by 
a strategy which has been aptly called “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson 2001). Erdoğan 
referred to the cross-border attachments of immigrants of Turkish origin in Germany in urging 
them to practice transnational nationalism, thus simply redefining the transnational in a way 
that may be interpreted as transplanting Turkish politics to Germany, hence a sort of long-
distance nationalism. In no way did he refer to transnational social spaces in between Turkey 
and Europe – a space which by now has achieved a dynamic and a life of its own (Faist 
2000). Ultimately, Erdoğan alluded to transnationality only superficially in order to get across 
his major point: the competition of two nations, the German and the Turkish. 
 
This train of thought has pervaded many speeches and statements by Turkish politicians of 
the current AKP government over the past decade. A recent statement by the Minister of 
Economics, Zafer Cağlayan, reinforced this message:  
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You should never assimilate and you should never forget your language and 
religion. Yet you should naturalize and become citizens in the countries in which 
you live. You should enter the economic and political streams, ask critical 
questions and exercise the right to vote. If you do so, you will be a formidable 
power which cannot be ignored17.   
 
It is quite evident that the processes of exclusion and inclusion engaged in by politicians in 
both Germany and Turkey refer to issues of national (social) integration. Applied to Turkish 
politicians, one may even speak of an opportunity hoarding mechanism, seeking to 
monopolize the representation of Turkish migrants across borders. 
 
The mechanism of reactive reframing can be found in the pronouncements of several 
(umbrella) associations of Turkish immigrants, mostly as a response to dominant discourses 
which emphasized the necessity of social integration. Up until the mid-1990s, reference to 
transnational ties was more frequent than later on (Rauer 2010). Since then, transnational 
issues have been dealt with in ambiguous ways. For example, the Turkish Community Berlin 
(Türkische Gemeinde Berlin, TGB) stated that it would keep strict neutrality regarding all 
political, religious and ethnic conflicts in Turkey. Yet in the same breath, the TGB noted that it 
could position itself on events and developments in Turkey if it influences or compromises 
the situation of the Turkish minority in Germany. On these matters there has been 
competition among migrant associations. For example, the Council of Turkish Citizens (Rat 
der Türkischen Staatsbürger, RTS18) accused the TGB of being a “tool of Ankara”, a 
“nationalist lobby”. Since the mid-1990s the strategy of the TGB has changed; now 
discussions are geared toward integration in Germany and occlude politics in Turkey. This 
may also be part of a more general shift in the positions taken by Turkish migrant 
associations which, partly in response to civic integrationist pressures, now cater much more 
to the integration agenda (Faist and Amelina 2008). An analysis of all reports in four major 
nation-wide newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Sueddeutsche Zeitung; Die Welt; 
die tageszeitung) between 1995 and 2004 confirms this: five major topics are noted (number 
of articles in parentheses): citizenship (N= 241), Islam (N=203), integration (N=200), 
exclusion and racism (N=129), accession of Turkey to the EU (N=72), and other (N=66) 
(Rauer 2010: 77). Despite this decisive shift, which could be described as a reactive 
reframing of the context of integration, from the perspective of most Turkish migrant 
associations, the national and the transnational are seen to interact. For example, political 
and social inclusion through naturalization was considered to depend upon a higher 
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tolerance of dual citizenship. Although migrant associations were only minor players in the 
debates on dual citizenship, they expressed a clear demand for increased political 
participation.19  
 
The Symbolic Politics of Doing National Identity and Integration as a Meta-Issue 
 
So far we have analyzed the binary and nominal categorizations employed in discourses on 
national identity and integration with respect to transnationality and have identified some of 
the mechanisms which involve transnationality in the semantic production of inequalities. It is 
now possible to turn to the political context in which categorizations and resulting 
hierarchizations of transnationality operate; usually in conjunction with other heterogeneities 
such as religion. How is the binary transnational-national instrumentalized politically, and 
what are the consequences for inequalities?  
 
Public debates are struggles over interpretations of symbolic boundaries. Ideas concatenate 
into discursive categorizations and result in hierarchizations. In this case the categories used 
to describe integration vs. disintegration and, concomitantly, national vs. transnational do not 
simply organize lived reality in appropriate categories in the sense of an accurate 
representation of processes. At the very least, such categorizations are involved in the 
creation of the perception of that reality and its interpretation. If these available 
categorizations are used for decisions in policy-making, they then link directly to political 
structures and decision-making (cf. Foucault 2004: 187)20.  
 
Migration in general and transnationality more specifically are easy to instrumentalize 
politically. Integration and, implicitly, transnationality serve as meta-issues (Lasswell 1938), 
which abound in symbolic politics (Edelman 1964). All kinds of issues, such as 
unemployment, cutbacks in the welfare state or terrorism, can be tagged onto migration and 
integration. The symbolic uses of politics helped to construct migration as a meta-issue: in 
the 1980s, by not recognizing the reality of immigration, it could be successfully used as a 
factor allegedly accounting for the deleterious effects of economic crisis and policy failures 
(Faist 1994). In the 1990s and 2000s transnationality in the sense of continued attachments 
across borders, such as speaking the language of origin at home, has come to be seen as 
an impediment to social integration into German society. Overall, migration, integration and 
transnational ties have thus become meta-issues for social inequalities, associated with 
various “social problems”. The opportunities for symbolic politics and the use of migration as 
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a meta-issue to bolster national identity have even increased over the past few years. With 
the arrival of a new age of austerity, the capacity of national states to mediate between the 
rights of citizens on the one hand and the requirements of capital accumulation on the other 
has been severely affected. Governments everywhere face stronger resist¬ance to tax 
increases, particularly in highly indebted countries where infusions of public money will be 
needed for many years to pay for goods that have long been consumed. Although and 
perhaps because it has become increasingly difficult to pretend that the tensions between 
capitalism and democracy can be han¬dled within the boundaries of national political 
communities, symbolic politics sometimes is a convenient escape. In order to be effective 
symbolically, and this is a crucial requisite for politicization, the transnational needs to appear 
as a very concrete danger, albeit a diffuse one. Otherwise transnationality cannot be 
instrumentalized. In a way, it is quite puzzling that the transnational - so fluid and malleable 
by definition – needs to be turned concrete in order to relate to the static logic of national 
states. This partly accounts for the empirical finding reported above, namely that 
transnationality is often depicted as a concrete threat to social integration (for example, the 3 
Ts mentioned above), whereas the national is not defined, as in the debate on the guiding 
culture. In a nutshell, politicians seek such issues to demonstrate that they can deal with 
cross-border matters or with what is called globalization. The issues which are picked up in 
public debates vary from country to country. In Germany and the Netherlands, for example, 
dual citizenship was at the center of symbolic politics in the 1990s. In these two cases dual 
citizens were portrayed by the critics of multiple citizenship as reaping undue advantages, 
such as the right to vote twice.  
 
Nonetheless, there is contestation of devaluation and hierarchization. Interestingly, the same 
types of arguments used to distinguish national-liberal-modern from transnational-illiberal-
traditional are used by those symbolically excluded to claim inclusion. For example, the 
demand for freedom to practice religion and for institutional integration on the same footing 
as established religious communities is frequently put forward by the excluded on the 
argument of human rights violations. This specific kind of counter-mechanism already points 
to the changing ways and the limits of using the transnational to define the national. 
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Conclusion: The Limits of the Binary National vs. Transnational 
 
The binaries of national-transnational and the nominal categorizations of transnationality are 
particular expressions of the relations between national identity and the Other. The 
representation of national identity is supported by tenets on integration, and the reference to 
the transnational serves to distinguish integration from non-integration or disintegration. A 
caveat must be kept in mind here: mechanisms such as symbolic exclusion, culturalist 
ranking and generalization via reference to social integration into the nation do not apply to 
all immigrant groups, or at all times. Some groups over time may come to be perceived as 
part of “us”, an effort directed at equalization. Moreover, Germans abroad (the highly-skilled, 
such as scientists) and highly-skilled labor deemed desirable for recruitment to the German 
labor market are not discussed in terms of integration but within the framework of economic 
competitiveness. In this way, the empirical examples discussed suggest that it is useful to 
conceive of transnationality as a heterogeneity involved in the discursive production of 
inequalities. The social mechanisms by which this is achieved, for example, symbolic 
exclusion and culturalist ranking, both function as distancing mechanisms which serve to 
produce and maintain hierarchies. There are also efforts at inclusion from those affected by 
discursive exclusion, which constitute counter-mechanisms. Yet the dominant discourse on 
national identity and integration has mainly proceeded in public arenas without strong 
involvement of the voices of those excluded. The production of such discursive inequalities 
with potential for and actual links to social structural and institutionally based inequalities is 
reinforced through the instrumentalization of integration in political debates, for example, for 
political campaigns. In such contexts, we frequently encounter symbolic politics, which is 
reinforced by the use of migration, integration and transnational ties of migrants as meta-
issues.  
 
There may be limits, however, to the production of inequalities based on transnationality. 
This applies in particular to the binary national-transnational. The juxtaposition of national 
versus transnational may become problematic as a binary categorization to the extent that 
“value generalization” (Talcott Parsons) is advancing. According to Parsons, the more a 
society becomes differentiated, the more its values become abstract in order to legitimate all 
its different functions, segments and subcultures. The higher degrees of differentiation within 
the system of modern societies result in problems of systems and social integration. Usually, 
such problems – for example, the norms held relevant to produce social integration – can 
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only be plausibly addressed by including new entities, structures and mechanisms within the 
normative frame of society.21  As we have seen, public debates in Germany over the past 
twenty years have been replete with multiple references to frames going far beyond cultural 
specificities and into the realm of a liberal (political, social, economic) order. The frequent 
invocation of human rights is just one example (cf. Moyn 2010). These new elements need to 
be placed within the normative structure of society, a process Parsons called “value 
generalization”. In other words, “when the network of socially structured situations becomes 
more complex, the value pattern itself must be couched at a higher level of generality in 
order to ensure social stability.” (Parsons 1971: 27) 
 
 
This insight is helpful in understanding the changing relationship between the national and 
the transnational. If Parsons’ claim holds true for the post-World War Two period and the 
country (Germany) we analyze, the national is ever more differentiating and it becomes more 
difficult to instrumentalize transnational ties politically. After all, much of what used to be 
discursively conceived of or portrayed as the transnational – including liberal convictions, a 
confession to human rights or republican understandings of nationality – is (now) part of 
national self-understanding. The boundaries of the national have been widening. In other 
words, the transnational redefines the national by the incorporation of the former by the 
latter. Yet how can the transnational be instrumentalized when the national is ever more 
differentiating? Since Germany has been in the process of redefining itself to include (certain 
types of) Islam or tolerate cross-border loyalties, and as an immigrant society, the Other 
cannot just be the migrant or foreigner as such anymore. As a consequence, the boundaries 
of national identity are remade and now the agents draw lines between bad and good 
foreigners and good and bad forms of transnationality.  
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2 Adherence to liberal norms is by no way the only exclusionary criterion. Yet in a country like Germa-
ny, statements which openly discriminate categories along “race” would be expected to be rare be-
cause the racist past of the Nazi regime is shunted present in the public sphere.. 
3 On social mechanisms of inequality, see Tilly 1998. 
4 Two research projects in the Collaborative Research Center “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” 
(CRC 882) deal with the ambiguity of transnationality. Both projects mainly deal with social structural 
analysis and not, as does this paper, with analysis of public discourses. The project “Transnationality 
and the Unequal Distribution of Social Protection” analyses the nominal categorizations in Turkish-
German, Polish-German and Kazakh-German social spaces. The project “Pilot Study: Longitudinal 
Panel” uses mixed methods, quantitative and qualitative, to design a longitudinal study of households 
in the German-Turkish space which also uses interval categorizations to capture the mobility of per-
sons, ideas, remittances etc. (http://www.sfb882.uni-bielefeld.de). 
5 A third meaning is not discussed here. Transnationality can be captured as an ordinal categorization 
which is useful for measuring cross-border transactions across time for social agents (for example, 
over life courses). In this case it refers to practices and competences of persons, such as visits, send-
ing remittances or engaging in transnational political claims-making. In this paper we refer mostly to 
the first and second dimensions. This focus implies that we use a very wide and lose notion of trans-
nationality. 
6 A third main debate, citizenship discourse on social rights, social security in particular, cannot be 
dealt with here for reasons of space; see also Eder et al. 2004: chapter 3 who found these three topi-
cal issues the main arenas of public debate in major German newspapers from 1996 until 1999. 
7 Similar statements abound in public debates. In the words of the Bavarian minister of the interior at 
the time (1999),  
(r)eal integration demands, first of all, major accomplishments from individuals. The acquisition 
of the German language is a first crucial step. In addition, foreign fellow citizens must devote 
themselves to our state and its societal and constitutional order and value systems with no ifs, 
ands, or buts. Respecting our political, social, and cultural conditions is essential. (Günter Beck-
stein, cited in Göktürk et al. 2007: 303) 
8 In academic discourse, the two are very different: multiculturalism is mainly concerned with social 
integration within the national state, without explicit consideration of cross-border transactions, where-
as transnationalization as an analytical perspective takes into account the latter, leaving open the unit 
to which integration refers – immigration or emigration national states, migrant groups, localities, etc. 
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9 Executive Officer of the Society for Endangered People, and International organization for the human 
rights of Kurds. 
10 Peter Huber, then Minister of Interior of Thuringia, in Bundestags-Plenarprotokoll 17/25: 2232B, cf. 
Bundesrats-Protokoll 869/2010: 117B. 
11 Gerhard Schröder, Speech opening Cebit on 21 March 2001 in Hannover; 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/1X_34261.htm 
12 A typical statement in parliament (Bundestag) raising the issue of “brain drain” goes like this:   
We need the best brains. Yet the problem is: These brains are thinking too often in other places 
in this world. It is simply a fact that the country of poets and thinkers is losing its thinkers. The 
data although incomplete, show this: In 2005 about 150,000 Germans emigrated, about 
100,000 have returned. There is already a big gap. The significance can be played down, as 
you did, Mr. Schäuble. However, we have to take this problem seriously. (Thea Dückert, Bünd-
nis 90/Die Grünen, in: Deutscher Bundestag 2007 Plenarprotokoll 16/ 119: Stenographischer 
Bericht, 119. Sitzung. Tagesordnungspunkt 28: Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sibylle Lau-
rischk, Rainer Brüderle, Dirk Niebel, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP: Konse-
quenzen der Auswanderung Hochqualifizierter aus Deutschland. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 
pp. 12371- 12394, here: p. 12383, own translation) 
13 See the documents in: Deutscher Bundestag 2007 Drucksache 16/5417. Antwort der Bundesregie-
rung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sibylle Laurischk, Rainer Brüderle, Dirk Niebel, weite-
rer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP -Drucksache 16/3210-: Konsequenzen der Auswanderung 
Hochqualifizierter aus Deutschland. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag. 
14 Sometimes, the interpretation then immediately moves from arguments emphasizing “brain drain” to 
desirable mobility in and out of Germany:  
The mobility of highly skilled workers can only be appreciated, for Germany, in the case of for-
eign specialists and scholars alike. It is in our own interest that our scientists and professionals 
go abroad to educate themselves, to collect personal experiences and to return with this 
knowledge back home. In the same way, we are interested to attract internationally renowned 
scientists and professionals to work in our country. (Annette Hübinger for the parliamentary fac-
tion of CDU and CSU -. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/119, October 2007: 12391 
15 The interview guidelines were part of a train of measures: In 2005, Austria introduced a test examin-
ing civics knowledge, the Netherlands followed suit in 20006. In Germany, heated debates emerged 
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when the Länder Baden-Württemberg and Hessia came up with guidelines for naturalization inter-
views. The proposal for a test in Baden-Württemberg came to be known as the “Muslim test” (Mus-
limtest). 
16http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/erdogan-rede-in-koeln-im-wortlaut-assimilation-ist-ein-
verbrechen-gegen-die-menschlichkeit-1.293718 
17 “Bulunmuş olduğunuz ülkelerde, asimile olmayacaksınız, dilinize ve dininizi asla unutmayacaksınız, 
o ülke vatandaşlığına geçerek, o ülkenin tüm siyset ve ticaret kanallarına geçerek, o ülkelerde hesap 
soran ve oy veren konumda olacaksınız. Bunları yaptığımız zaman hiç bir güç, bu gücün karşısında 
duramayacak.“ (Hüriyet, 19 November 2011) 
18 The RTS was founded in 1994 as a loose association of 17 Turkish and Turkish-German umbrella 
associations with approximately 2,000 single organizations. The RTS defines its goal as "the preserva-
tion of all aspects of Turkish citizens in Germany and the support and coordination of efforts of various 
clubs and associations. In general, political demands of the RTS are dual citizenship, combating xen-
ophobia and protection against attacks and to improving the living conditions and the legal situation of 
Turkish migrants and their children. 
19 One of the crucial questions for further analysis is whether exclusionary mechanisms ultimately 
result in self-identification as a sort of self-otherization among the immigrant groups concerned (Hall 
1996). This possibility would imply that not only the receiving group but also the newcomers conceive 
of themselves as the Other. Another possibility is that those affected negotiate their way around domi-
nant beliefs. 
20 The public debates and the negative portrayals of some types of transnationality, that is, the trans-
national connections of some types of migrants expressing or resulting in disintegration, are frequently 
far removed from the actual practices of transnationality in everyday life, in manifold localities, as ob-
served in empirical research (see, for example, Faist and Özveren 2004). Research thus suggests a 
much more nuanced and balanced picture of transnationality as a heterogeneity. While a number of 
studies, particularly within the American context, have shown that transnational resources can contrib-
ute to improving the social position of the lower-income groups (see Levitt and Jaworsky 2007), such 
findings refer mostly to national frames of reference in the country of settlement, and implications for 
the place of origin have not yet been examined systematically beyond case studies. For a transnation-
al inequality perspective, the dynamics of multiple places of reference within a transnational space 
must be taken into account. By the same token, multiple affiliations can also give rise to new re-
strictions and conflicts; for example between those who remain spatially immobile and take care of 
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supporting children and elderly family members on the one hand and those migrating abroad on the 
other hand. 
21 Since we use Parson’s position on value generalization only as a heuristic, we take the term “socie-
ty” as being unproblematic for this analysis. Also, we do not argue that value generalization is inher-
ently evolutionary in terms of an ever progressing march toward ever more abstract norms. Reversals 
are possible. 
